Family and intimacy

I am skeptical to arguments of causality in general. Whether the diversification of family setups is a cause or consequence off changing attitudes about intimacy, love and commitment lacks of interest for me if the mechanisms and processes are not disentangled. I agree with the idea that explanations should be analyzed using individual, psychological, economic, social and cultural frameworks, as well as with a historical perspective. In this sense, one of the issues that the readings of this week miss, from my point of view, is the role of social networks, specially extended families and local communities. Capitalism seems to be the responsible for individualism and commercialization of intimate life, but what other factors have transformed the roles of neighbors, extended family members, religious institutions and others as sources of support. For example, in the case of migrant families that leave extended family behind, it is natural to create new relationships with friends. Roseneil and Budgeon explore the individualization thesis and the queering of the social thesis and argue that instead of studying the redefinitions of the family, “the exploration of networks and flows of intimacy and care, the extent and pattern of such networks, the viscosity and velocity of such flows, and the implications of their absence, is likely to prove much more fruitful for future research” (2004, p. 153). How do social network resources differ by class and socioeconomic status? In this sense, I would argue that just like in other sociological debates that suffer of the discussion between structure and agency, the social networks framework is useful to understanding social processes and transformations.
About the discussion of love, intimacy and sexuality, I would recover what Giddens talks about romantic and passionate love. If the ideals of love where connected to moral values of Christianity, what happens when Christianity looses power? Is it the case only that sexuality and love are disconnected from morality or is it the case that morality is transformed? How can we get rid of this double morality of what should be and what is good? Giddens also notes that the rise of romantic love coincided with the emergence of the novel and that the romantic literature, which was mainly written by women, is both an expression of weakness and hope. Have the romantic novels transformed into women advice books (also mainly written by women) due to the ‘commercialization of intimate life’ or because Hollywood, popular television and other media has been teaching us how to have sex and those in the writing business do not want to stay away and make us feel we are part of a reality show by telling us how live our wedding day? If, as Hochschild says “cultures differ in the pictures they project of ‘perfect love’” (2003, p. 122), how these different pictures have been portrayed through time and to what extent these cultural preferences act like structural barriers?
Q1. While reading Hochschild, the issue of selection comes always to my mind. Who do you think reads the advice books? Would a policy recommendation be to promote personalized psychological therapy while telling women not to read advice books or at least saying to read them critically?
Q2. Is intimacy a public good? Why do we care? Shouldn’t that stay in the private sphere?
Q3. How can culture dissociate moral values from family arrangements and sexuality? Would this be helpful to put less stress on gays and lesbians, single mothers, cohabitating couples, childless women, and others?